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Is Public R&D a Complement or Substitute for Private R&D?
 A Review of the Econometric Evidence
By
Paul A. David, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Andrew A. Toole
Introduction
The opening of the new millennium finds a national public-sector civilian research
enterprise whose scale and scope in most of the world’s countries surpasses that of any
previous period of their history. Among the leading industrial nations this may be seen as
the outcome of a long historical process initiated with state patronage during the
scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. But, only since the closing decades of the
nineteenth century have organized research and development activities begun to make
appreciable claims upon the productive resources of those societies.
1 Since then,
however, the fraction of real gross national product being directed by both private and
governmental agencies toward expanding the base of scientific and technological
knowledge for non-defense purposes has trended upwards – halting at times, yet never
reversing significantly.
Most of the growth in the relative importance of this intangible form of capital
accumulation has come within the past half-century: even under the stimulus of military
preparations during the 1930’s, total R&D expenditures in countries such as the US, the
UK and Japan remained in the range between two-thirds and one quarter of one
percentage point of their respective national product figures.
2 In the aftermath of World
War II, the belief that organized research and development could stimulate economic
                                               
1 See, e.g., David (1998), Lenoir (1998), and sources cited therein.
2 See the estimates in Edgerton (1996), Table 5.8, but note that the R&D fraction shown for Japan (as 0.22
percent of national income in 1934) actually refers to share of GNP and is based on the results of a 1930David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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growth and contribute to improving economic welfare led to the creation of many new
public institutions supporting civilian science and engineering, and pushed the civil R&D
fraction upwards towards the 1 percentage point level in a growing number of countries.
The Cold War Era fostered a further expansion of government agency research programs
in non-defense as well as military technologies, and established models for the
performance of government funded R&D by private sector contractors. Thus,
accompanying the institutional expansion in public sector production of scientific and
technological knowledge, there were enormous increases in the scale of public financial
obligations for R&D activities performed primarily by non-governmental agents. Added
to these, a variety of tax and subsidy measures was introduced with the intention of
encouraging private firms to undertake R&D projects at their own expense.
3
Although most people believe that government R&D activities contribute to
innovation and productivity, many economists and policymakers have grown frustrated
with the paucity of systematic statistical evidence documenting a direct contribution from
public R&D. The burden of econometric findings concerning the productivity growth
effects of R&D seems to be that there is a significantly positive and relatively high rate of
return to R&D investments at both the private and social levels. Yet, quite generally,
privately funded R&D in manufacturing industries is found to yield a substantial
premium over the rates of return from “own productivity improvements” derived from
R&D performed with government funding.
4 In a recent survey, Griliches (1995: p.82)
suggests that the especially pronounced differential over the returns on tangible capital
                                                                                                                               
survey; a Japanese survey taken in 1942 returned expenditures on the order of 1.5 percent of GNP. See
Odagiri and Goto (1993), p. 84.
3 For an historical account focusing upon the US in the twentieth century, see Mowery and Rosenberg
(1989) and the contributions dealing with particular sectors and industries in Nelson (1982). For the post-
Cold War climate affecting government support, especially in the US, see Cohen and Noll (1997). Nelson
(1993) brings together profiles of the evolution of the ‘national innovation systems’ of a variety of
industrialized and some developing countries, mainly since the 1960’s; Soligen (1994) provides a broader,
internationally comparative treatment of relations between scientific research and the twentieth century
state.
4 See Griliches (1995), and Hall (1996) for recent surveys. Negative findings on the productivity growth
payoff from government expenditures for industrial R&D emerged from an earlier econometric studies by
Griliches (1980), Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), Bartelsman (1990), and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991),David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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investments observed at the private level may reflect individual firms’ perceptions of
especially high private risk in the case of R&D. The latter would, of course, lead to the
imposition of higher hurdle rates of return for firms’ individual funding decisions;
whereas, by comparison, government-funded industrial R&D projects would be seen as
carrying less (private) risk, especially as much of it is devoted to “product innovation” for
“output” that eventually is to be sold back to the government procurement agency under
the terms of “cost plus” contracts. In such circumstances there is little basis for expecting
that the R&D it performed with public monies would have a substantial direct impact on
the contracting firm’s own productivity.
1.2 The Issue: Substitution vs. Complementarity in Public and Private R&D
Investments
 Having a direct impact on innovation that shows up as industrial productivity
growth, however, is not the only way in which public R&D may enhance economic
performance. Public funding of R&D can contribute indirectly, by complementing and
hence stimulating private R&D expenditures, even if it has been undertaken with other
purposes in view. Government agencies sponsor some research and development projects
and programs because the knowledge gained is expected to be germane to their respective
mission capabilities, as often is the case, for example, in areas such as military
technology and logistics, and public health. This kind of R&D work sometimes will be
assigned to the staffs of public institutes and national laboratories, although it equally
may be procured through government contracts with R&D-performing firms in the
private sector.
5 Beyond its putative direct value as an input into the provision of
                                                                                                                               
some of which obtained coefficients on federally-funded R&D that were close to zero as well as
statistically insignificant.
5 For example, the 1996/97 data compiled by Stoneman (1999: Tables 1 and 6), show that UK government
funded 31.8 percent of total (military and civil) R&D, somewhat less than half of which (14.4 percent of
total R&D) was performed in government departments and laboratories run by the Research Councils.
From the National Science Board (1998: Appendix Table 4-3) figures for the US in 1996, the
corresponding (federal and non-federal) government shares in funding and performance are seen to be 32.5
percent and 8.9 percent, respectively. By adding to the latter figure the 3.3 percent of federal government
funded R&D that was performed in non-profit federally funded research and development centers
(analogous to the research units of the UK Research Councils), we arrive at 12.2 percent for the overallDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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government-provided services, both the defense-related and civilian R&D expenditures
funded through public agencies may generate social benefits, in the form of knowledge
and training “spillovers.” These often are held to enhance private sector productive
capabilities, and, specifically, to encourage applied R&D investments by firms that lead
to technological innovations -- from which will flow future streams of producer and
consumer surpluses.
6
The theoretical plausibility of such claims notwithstanding, available empirical
evidence on the issue remains rather short of being conclusive, to say the least.
Economists, continuing in the tradition pioneered by the research of Blank and Stigler
(1957), recurrently examine a variety of data for signs as to whether the relationship
between public and private R&D investments is on balance characterized by
“complementarity,” or by “substitution.” Several recent econometric studies, for
example, document positive, statistically significant “spillover” effects via the
stimulation of private R&D investment by publicly funded additions to the stock of
scientific knowledge.
7 The same might be said regarding a considerably more extensive
body of historical case studies, detailing the influence of government-sponsored research
programs and projects on commercial technological innovation.
8  Many among the latter
studies, however, focus on US federally funded research performed in academic
institutions or quasi-academic public institutes, and so do not bear immediately on the
questions raised concerning the impacts of publicly sponsored R&D conducted under
contract by industrial corporations. Nor do they inform us about the effects of publicly
funded mission-oriented commercial research in the rest of the world. Moreover, while
some studies in this area have been able to support claims of positive spillovers from
                                                                                                                               
share of total R&D that was performed in US government research facilities. The latter, like the US
governmental share in total R&D funding, rather closely resembles the contemporary situation prevailing in
the UK.
6 See, for example, the recent formulation of the economic case for public support of research, in National
Research Council (1999), esp. Chs. 1-2, with historical case studies drawn from the US federal
government’s role in the development of computing and communications technologies.
7 That, at least, is the presumptive interpretation of the results reported by Jaffe (1989), Adams (1990), Acs
et al. (1991), and Toole (1999). See further discussion in Section 3.4, below.
8 Among recent, sophisticated contributions to this literature, see Link and Scott (1998), and National
Research Council (1999).David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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public to private expenditures, there is no shortage of investigations that arrive at the
contrary conclusion. Thus, it is found that some public R&D contracts actually have done
little or nothing to promote the efficient functioning of the government agencies
involved, and yet also failed to provide significant commercial “spillovers.” In still other
instances, the benefits that private companies derived from the public R&D expenditures
are said to have been both predictable and large enough to have elicited financing by
profit-seeking firms, had the political process not invoked subsidization of those projects
at the tax-payers’ expense.
9 Wherever publicly funded R&D is seen to be simply
substituting for, or actually "crowding-out" private R&D investment, it obviously is hard
to justify such expenditures on the grounds that they exerted an immediate net positive
impact upon industrial innovation and productivity growth.
10
Simply counting up the numbers of findings pro and con that have accumulated
on the issue of public-private R&D complementarity since the mid-1960’s, however,
cannot be very informative. Our approach instead will be to survey the available body of
econometric work systematically, and in some detail, from an analytical perspective.
Although we take notice of a number of time-series studies that have been carried out at
the macroeconomic level, most of this inquest is concerned with research that focuses on
the impact of public R&D contracts and grants upon private R&D investment by
manufacturing firms and industries. It is there that the bulk of R&D expenditures by the
world’s developed economies continues to be concentrated. Our purpose in this is to
assess the reliability of the statistical findings and to arrive at a better understanding of
the reasons for the persisting lack of a clear-cut empirical consensus in the literature.
Three quite restricted questions will be asked regarding those investigations. First,
is the design of the statistical analysis such that it can yield any reliable findings on the
question of whether government R&D expenditures do or do not have a significant and
economically palpable impact upon their private sector counterparts? Secondly, where
                                               
9 See, e.g., Cohen and Noll’s (1991) examination of a selection of large-scale mission-oriented commercial
R&D programs that were funded by the US federal government.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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the findings are credible, may we conclude that government subsidy programs do not
displace private R&D investment, but instead have the complementary effect of inducing
additional company-funded R&D activities? Thirdly, how can the econometric findings
be reconciled with those of other well-designed studies that addressed ostensibly the
same question, yet arrived at different conclusions?
At this time, the econometric results obtained from careful studies at both the
micro- and macro-levels tend to be running in favor of findings of complementarity
between public and private R&D investments. But, that reading is simply an unweighted
summary based upon some thirty diverse studies; it is not a conclusion derived from a
formal statistical “meta-analysis,” and in no sense is it offered here as a judgement that
would pretend to settle the issue definitively. To formally weigh up and aggregate the
available (and still-growing array of statistical analyses) seems to us a virtually
impossible task in this case. We are not dealing with statistical results that have been
generated by properly designed “experiments”, where provision was made in the policy
process for replication and “controls.” Instead, we are dealing with ex post inquiries, and
the results reported by many of the individual papers that constitute the literature on this
topic reflect a convolution of many counterbalancing effects that are further compounded
with the effects of a varying mix of public funding and other incentives for R&D
activities. The ability of the econometricians to impose ex post statistical controls varies
widely among these studies. Moreover, they are distributed over differing time periods,
and across a variety of scientific and technological fields, as well as diverse sectors and
different economies.
Inasmuch as the spheres of investigation as well as the findings considered here
are far from uniform, it is difficult to see what good would be served by striving for a
broad empirical generalization that might mask clear-cut instances, however few, where
publicly funded R&D is found substantially to displace private investment. Indeed, the
better way of proceeding would seem to lie in trying more precisely to identify and
                                                                                                                               
10 It remains conceivable, however, that some special features of the government sponsored projects create
capabilities in the performing firms that are conducive in the longer run to increased private R&DDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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delineate the characteristics of the circumstances in which “substitution” effects
predominate. Policy-making in this area of growing long-term importance calls for more
specific empirical support and guidance if it is to advance beyond general theoretical
arguments, intuitive practical judgements, and political rhetoric.
1.2 Cautions Regarding the Survey’s Scope and Limitations
It should be made explicit at the outset that the present review is addressed to only
one aspect of the broader empirical picture that is of interest for public policy formation.
For one thing, we do not examine the large body of evidence on the relative productivity
impacts of public and private R&D.
11 A second issue that we do not treat in any detail is
the other side of the interdependence of public and private R&D spending, namely, the
latter’s impact upon the former. Many of the micro-level empirical studies we have
surveyed treat public R&D either explicitly or implicitly as an exogenous influence on
private R&D within an investment framework. Consequently, in a number of instances
we do find it necessary to point out the econometric consequences of ignoring the
existence of latent variables that may jointly effect both public- and private-sector
decisions to allocate R&D funding to specific industrial areas, and to have the work
performed by particular (rather than randomly drawn) firms. Our discussion recurrently
touches on this point, arguing that more attention to structural modeling of government
agency behavior as well as industrial R&D responses is needed for a proper interpretation
of the overall, reduced-form findings.
12 This may be seen as an instance of the more
general case that David and Hall (1999) advance for taking an explicit structural
modeling approach to mitigate the frequency of apparent contradictions and ambiguities
in the econometric literature.
1.3 Organization
                                                                                                                               
investment, to higher marginal innovation yields, or to both.
11 More recent work on this question is surveyed by Klette, Moen, and Griliches (2000, in this volume).
12 The studies by Leyden, Link, and Bozeman (1989), and Leyden and Link (1991) are noticed as having
set a good example for future work in this regard.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
8
The remaining presentation is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
conceptual framework for understanding the net effects of public R&D upon private
R&D investment activities. Section 3 reviews and critiques the available econometric
research findings, beginning with studies carried out using data for the line-of-business
and laboratory level (3.1), and progressing upwards to those concerned with effects at the
level of the firm (3.2), the industry (3.3) and the aggregate economy (3.4). Because the
bulk of the economic research on this question looks at publicly funded R&D that is
being performed under the terms of government contracts with commercial firms, the
main focus of discussion in this survey falls upon programs of that kind. In section 3.5,
however, notice is taken also of a small body of econometric studies that examine the
impacts on private R&D of publicly funded/publicly performed research or publicly
funded/non-profit performed research.
13 We conclude in section 4 with several
methodological observations and suggestions for future research in this area of perennial
policy relevance.
2. "Net” Private R&D Effects of Public R&D: A Conceptual Framework
Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to pause to ask what modern “technology
policy measures” have been meant to achieve. Presumably the central rationale for
government support of R&D is the correction of the market failures in the production of
scientific and technological knowledge, arising from the “incomplete private
appropriability” problems identified by Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959). Economists
have indicated two main policy responses to the resulting tendency towards under-
provision of knowledge-based innovative effort on the part of profit-seeking business
entities: direct procurement and/or production in public facilities, and incentives for a
greater amount of private investment. We have here eschewed issues concerning the first
                                               
13 Recent studies by Jaffe et al. (1996, 1998) use patent citations to investigate the flow of knowledge and
commercial technology out of federal labs, but our discussion is restricted to papers that explicitly deal withDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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of these, primarily those involving the performance of public research institutes and
national laboratories, and have restricted our review exclusively to the second class of
policy responses.
2.1 Tax incentives vs. direct subsidies for R&D
Under that heading two main policy instruments may be identified: tax incentives
that reduce the cost of R&D, and direct subsidies that raise the private marginal rate of
return on investment in such activities. Although not strictly necessary, the primary
difference in execution between these two policy instruments is that the former typically
allows the private firms to choose projects, whereas the latter usually is accompanied by
a government directed project choice, either because the government spends the funds
directly or because the funds are distributed via grants to firms for specific projects or
research areas.
The effectiveness of R&D tax credits in increasing R&D in private firms is
surveyed in Hall and van Reenen (1999/2000 in This issue). Because a tax credit directly
reduces the marginal cost of R&D, one would not expect to see “crowding out” effects on
industrial R&D, spending except via the channel of an increase in the real cost of R&D
(if the inputs are in inelastic supply). This implies that crowding out of nominal private-
sector R&D expenditures would not be observed, even though it is entirely possible that
there could be displacement of private real R&D investment if the prices of the inputs
increased sufficiently.
14 Tax credits, however, do not leave the composition of R&D
unaffected. As firms expand their R&D activity in response to linked tax offsets against
earnings, the incentives are likely to favor projects that will generate greater profits in the
short-run. Consequently, projects with high social rates of return, and long-run
exploratory projects and “research infrastructure” investments in particular, may be less
favored by the expansion of private funding. In this way, rather weaker “spillover”
                                                                                                                               
the impacts upon private R&D investment.
14 See David and Hall (1999) for a full discussion of the impact of inelastic R&D inputs on the effects of
R&D subsidies.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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benefits to other firms and industries would be generated by the private response to
extensive reliance upon this particular pro-R&D policy instrument.
By contrast, direct funding of R&D programs designated by government agencies
allows public R&D subsidies to be targeted toward projects that are perceived to offer
high marginal social rates of return to investments in knowledge. At least in principle,
such funding could be concentrated in areas where there was a large gap between the
social and the private rate of return. For this reason, direct R&D subsidies or government
spending on basic research activities should not be expected to displace private real R&D
investment, except via its generic impacts on the price of research and development
inputs that are in inelastic supply. Yet, the possibility remains that in the politics of
technology policy formation there will be strong pressures to provide subsidies for
projects with high private marginal rates of return – possibly to assure the appearance of
successful public “launch aid”, or simply because the prospective private payoffs make
lobbying for subsidies an attractive undertaking. In such circumstances it is more likely
that increased direct government funding for industrial R&D projects would enable firms
correspondingly to reduce their own outlays. This form of “investment displacement”
arises primarily because R&D activities are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, and
it is distinguishable from, and additional to the form of “crowding out” identified by
David and Hall (1999) as operating through the R&D input market effects of public
expenditures.
2.2 The need for a structural framework
When considered as a whole, the literature under review here may be
characterized as predominantly inductive in its approach to considering the effects of
government R&D funding upon the level of business R&D investment behavior. That is
not simply to say that the orientation of this work has been primarily empirical rather
than analytical, but, rather that the empirical approach pursued is essentially descriptive
in nature, aiming at establishing the sign and magnitude of the overall or "net" effect in
question. Few studies in this area have been especially concerned to delineate theDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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different channels of influence that may connect R&D resource allocation in the two
spheres, and fewer still attempt structural estimation in order to ascertain the character
and strength of the underlying effects associated with each such channel.
Although all these empirical studies acknowledge being motivated by the same
over-arching policy issue, the widespread tendency to eschew explicit structural
modeling has reinforced the common failing of econometric work in this field to specify
adequately what "experiment" the investigators implicitly envisage conducting. In other
words, supposing one could vary government policy, what observed pairings of policy
action(s) and sequelae would establish whether public and private R&D were
"complements" or "substitutes?" Taken together with the fact that a large number of very
different empirical "experiments" at various levels of aggregation are contemplated (in
effect) by the research literature, this lack of specification contributes to the difficulties of
interpreting the individual findings and reconciling the seeming contradictions among
them.
For the foregoing reasons, rather than out of any methodological pre-commitment
to favor structural modeling approaches in econometric analysis, we believe it will be
best to review the evidence presented by the individual studies only after having set out a
general conceptual framework that identifies the array of hypothesized micro-level
determinants of private sector R&D investment, and relates these in turn to relationships
that hold and manifest themselves at the macro-level. That is our task in the present
section.
2.3 Determinants of private R&D investment at the micro-level
A useful framework for understanding how public R&D affects R&D funding
decisions in the private sector is provided by an adaptation of a familiar, rather
elementary model of firm-level investment behavior. To our knowledge, such a
framework was first employed for this purpose by Howe and McFetridge (1976). It
postulates that, at each point in time (or for each planning period), an array of potentialDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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R&D investment projects is available.
15 The firm is assumed to rationally consider the
expected cost and benefit streams for each project, in order to calculate its expected rate
of return. Under certain conditions these can be thought of as internal rates of return and
therefore used by the firm in question to rank the associated projects in descending order
of anticipated yield, thereby forming its marginal rate of return (MRR) schedule.
A downward-sloping schedule of this kind appears in Figure 1, where the
marginal yield (and the marginal cost of capital) is plotted on the vertical axis, and the
horizontal axis gives the cumulated amount of investment required as one proceeds down
the list of projects. (Following expositional convention, each project is implicitly taken as
being finely divisible, so that the resulting MRR schedule is continuous and continuously
differentiable.) Under this construction, as one moves along a given schedule describing
the distribution of projects in the firm's prevailing "technological innovation possibility
set," there is no alteration in the constellation of other variables that would influence the
rates of return on the array of R&D projects in the firm's potential portfolio. The net
impact of any and all alternations in those other conditions, therefore, must show up as
shifts in the MRR schedule.
[Figure 1 about here.]
As also may be seen from Figure 1, the firm faces a marginal cost of capital
schedule (MCC), which reflects the opportunity cost of investment funds at different
levels of R&D investment.
16 The upward slope of this schedule over its full range is
                                               
15 This formulation abstracts from important issues concerning the determinants of the firm's access to the
scientific and engineering knowledge base that is relevant for formulating plausibly feasible R&D projects,
and estimating the time-distribution of the costs and benefits of the innovations they would generate. There
is a well-known recursion problem here, inasmuch as among the research projects that a rational decision
process would need to consider is the project for gaining the knowledge required to construct and evaluate
its current "innovation possibility set". But, in a full dynamic specification, it is straightforward analytically
to treat the latter as a lagged endogenous variable.
16 This implicitly holds constant the amount of other, tangible capital formation expenditures that the firm
has scheduled for the planning period in question. Although the assumption of risk neutrality on the part of
the firm is implied by the use of the expected marginal rate of return as a sufficient statistic to describe each
project in the portfolio, it should be recognized that in practical capital-budgeting exercises firms addDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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attributable to the fact that as the volume of R&D investment is increased the firm will
have to move from financing projects with internally generated funds (i.e., retained
earnings) to calling upon external (equity and debt) funding. Use of retained earnings for
R&D accounts for the flat range at the left of the MCC schedule, whereas the firm's
increased recourse to external financing would tend to push its marginal costs of capital
upwards.
17
It should be apparent that as the MCC schedule in Figure 1 describes the
opportunity cost of capital, it would slope upwards eventually. This must be so even were
it the case that all of the firm's R&D investment remained financed out of retained
earnings; at the margin, expansion of the R&D investment budget would force the firm to
turn to external financing for its tangible capital acquisition projects.
The foregoing simplified schema can be represented by the following equations:
(1) MRR = f(R, X)
(2) MCC = g(R, Z),
where  R  is the level of R&D expenditure, and X  and  Z are vectors of other "shift
variables" that determine the distribution of project rates of return and the associated
marginal costs of capital, respectively. The X-variables reflect:
(i) the "technological opportunities" governing the ease with which it is possible
to generate innovations (relevant to the firm's market area);
(ii) the state of demand in its potential market area or line-of-business;
                                                                                                                               
premia to their marginal costs of capital, forming “hurdle rates of return” that allow for the riskiness of
various classes of investment. Although, for expositional simplicity it has been supposed that the tangible
capital formation budget has been pre-determined, at the margin R&D should compete with all other capital
projects on the basis of their risk-adjusted internal rates of return.
17 Obviously, in the case of R&D intensive "start-ups" there are no retained earnings upon which to draw.
But, the possibility exists of borrowing capital from employees by paying them with stock option, which
may keep the marginal cost of capital down so long as there is an adequate supply of qualified personnel
who also happen to have a high tolerance for risk, although issuance of stock options does have a cost due
to its effect in diluting equity.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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(iii) institutional and other conditions affecting the "appropriability" of innovation
benefits.
Correspondingly, the Z-variables include:
(i) technology policy measures that affect the private cost of R&D projects (such
as the tax treatment of that class of investment, R&D subsidies, and cost-sharing
programs of government procurement agencies);
(ii) macroeconomic conditions and expectations affecting the internal cost of
funds, via the general state of price-earnings ratios in equity markets;
(iii) bond market conditions affecting the external cost of funds;
(iv) the availability and terms of venture-capital finance, as influenced by
institutional conditions (such as the development of IPO markets) and the tax
treatment of capital gains.
As is depicted by Figure 1, in the firm’s profit maximizing equilibrium the
optimal level of R&D investment is found at R*, where the marginal rate of return and
the marginal cost of funds are equalized:
(3)  R* = h(X, Z).
Several points are now obvious about the relationship between
private R&D investment and public R&D funding. First, if we take the
provision of public funds to be exogenous, the effects of such "shocks"
would show up as a shift of either the firm's MRR schedule or its MCC
schedule, or of both. For example, direct R&D subsidies, and cost-
sharing arrangements by public agencies, by relieving the firm of some
joint costs of research and development activities would be tantamount
to shifting the position of its MCC schedule to the right. Had the firm
initially been facing increasing marginal costs of capital, this change
would permit the undertaking of additional projects with its own money -David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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- other things being equal, of course.
18 To cite another specific
illustration, the award of government R&D contracts to a small firm also
might have the effect of lowering the recipient’s capital costs at the
margin; especially in the case of start-up enterprises, where this could
act as a signal for external funding sources to apply a smaller risk
premium when setting their lending terms.
A number of other potential positive micro-level effects of
government contracts for industrially performed R&D, also have been
noticed in the literature following Blank and Stigler (1957). Each of the
following three would appear as an outward shift of the MRR schedule in
Figure 1:
(a) publicly subsidized R&D activity can yield learning and training
effects that acquaint the enterprise with the latest advances in scientific
and engineering knowledge, and so enhance its efficiency in conducting
its own R&D programs;
(b) where public funds are made available for construction of test
facilities and the acquisition of durable research equipment, and also pay
the fixed costs of assembling specialized research teams, the firm
involved may be able to conduct further R&D projects of its own at lower
(incremental) cost, and thereby derive higher expected internal rates of
return on its R&D investments;
(c) government contract R&D, by signaling future public sector
product demand, and private sector demand in markets for dual-use
goods and services, may raise the expected marginal rates of return on
product or process innovation targeted to those markets.
There is a distinct possibility that in the case of the above-
mentioned effects (a) and (c), the technological knowledge and market
                                               
18 It should be obvious, however, that were the firm facing a completely inelastic MCC constraint, the
public contract funding would not have any positive incremental impact upon the level of company-fundedDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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information associated with publicly funded R&D performed by one firm
could result in "spillovers." The latter would, similarly, raise the expected
marginal rates of return for other firms in the same industry, and also
for firms in other industries. Public R&D performed in academic and
other non-profit institutions, including government laboratories, also
could have correspondingly positive spillover effects. This is so,
particularly where the research resulted in the development of
"infrastructural knowledge" -- general principles, research tools and
techniques, and skill acquisition that raised the expected rates of return
on commercially-oriented, applied R&D projects.
19
2.4 Distinguishing between government R&D contracts and grants
When considering the potential "net" effects of public R&D activities, it is likely
to be important to distinguish between public contracts and grants. Government R&D
contracts in most instances are financial outlays to procure research results that are
expected to assist the public agency in better defining and fulfilling its mission
objectives. Such contracts are the largest component of public awards made to private
for-profit firms, and also include all arrangements to purchase R&D intensive-public
goods. This category covers much of the public aerospace and defense expenditure.
Public grants, on the other hand, are usually competitive financial awards that do not
carry any future public commitment to purchase. They are the primary mechanism for
funding exploratory research for the advancement of knowledge and fostering emerging
technologies.
 Since the path-breaking work of Blank and Stigler (1957), four channels have
been identified in the literature through which public contracts for industrially performed
R&D could stimulate “complementary” private R&D expenditures in the short run:
                                                                                                                               
R&D.
19  Leyden and Link (1991), and David, Mowery and Steinmueller (1992) suggest a variety of "spillover"
channels through which the infrastructure-forming aspects of so-called "basic" research funded -- and inDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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(i)  public R&D contracts increase the efficiency of the firm's R&D by lowering
common cost or increasing "absorptive capacity;"
(ii)  public R&D contracts signal future demand;
(iii)  public R&D contracts may improve the chances for success on the firm's other
projects;
(iv)  public R&D contracts allow firms to overcome fixed R&D startup costs --
"pump-priming."
These imply that public subsidies either shift the firm's marginal returns schedule
(in Figure 1) out to the right, and/or that the firm's opportunity cost of capital schedule is
shifted to the right, thereby eventually lowering the firms’ MCC for the higher levels of
R&D expenditure. The first three of the foregoing putative effects would shift the firm's
MRR schedule rightwards either by increasing the expected revenues or decreasing the
expected costs of the firm's available projects. The fourth effect, by decreasing a firm's
fixed costs, lowers the opportunity cost of capital and shifts this curve out to the right. All
of these “complementarity effects” suggest that public R&D contracts stimulate
additional private R&D investment.
From the preceding discussion it might appear that the micro-level
impact on private R&D investment of both government contracts for
industrial R&D and grants awarded to non-profit organizations would be
unambiguously positive. But, there are two sorts of countervailing
influences, both of which are likely to operate more strongly in the case
of contracts. First, the performance of contract-specified lines of R&D
with public funding may simply substitute for some (if not all) of the
investment that the performing firms otherwise would have been
prepared to undertake in order to be in a position to bid successfully for
related government procurement contracts.
                                                                                                                               
some cases performed -- in the public sector has a complementary impact upon private sector R&D
investment.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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Secondly, publicly funded R&D also may militate against private sector
investments in the same technological areas, because the expected rates of return to
investments by firms that do not receive contracts tend to be lowered by the prospect that
government contractors would succeed in producing commercially exploitable
innovations. Doing so could leave them well positioned to enter the final product market
with significant first-mover advantages. Non-contract receivers also might be
discouraged from undertaking their own R&D by the anticipation that the government
procurement agency in question would have an incentive to disseminate cost-saving and
quality-enhancing innovations, as a means of enabling entry and greater competition in
the end-product market. When viewed from the latter perspective, “dual-use” programs
of government procurement of R&D-intensive goods take on the appearance of a two-
edged sword.
20
Both the direct and the indirect "displacement" effects just considered may be
conceptualized as altering the shape of the firms' respective MRR schedules, reducing
expected marginal returns on R&D projects belonging to particular technological areas
that were "targeted" for public contract support. Although it is clear in principle that the
policy prescription should be for the government to select projects for subsidization that
the private sector is not likely to undertake, or not undertake in sufficient volume, matters
may be otherwise in actual practice. Pressures within public agencies for high "success
rates" in contract awards may lead to the use in R&D funding decisions of selection
criteria that put heavy weight on factors that are correlated positively with high expected
rates of return to private R&D funding. Therefore, when investigating the net effects of
government funded R&D at the micro-level, it is important to distinguish between
programs that provide grant funding and those that involve contracts. Likewise, when
                                               
20 Government procurement costs may be reduced by taking advantage of spillovers from industry funded
R&D directed towards civilian products. But the potential for the R&D performed under cost-plus
procurement contracts to have spillover effects on company financed R&D might, correspondingly, be
nullified by the heightened anticipation of competitive entry into the business of exploiting dual-use
designs. Such opportunities may exist where new high-tech systems required by government have
components, or utilize methods applicable to the production of goods for private purchasers. On the
benefits of dual-use technology programs, see Branscomb and Parker (1993).David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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dealing with questions concerning aggregate level effects of changes in policies affecting
public R&D, one should make allowance for the effects of any significant alterations in
the distribution of funding between those two modes.
Although government grants typically do not have a final product demand-
increasing component (such as is frequently present in the case of public contracts for
R&D performance), they may cause the MRR schedule to be shifted upwards nonetheless.
This would occur because a program of grant-funded research had raised firms’ R&D
efficiency, or had improved the risk-return pattern on other projects. The convention in
the literature, however, has been to abstract from the ways in which these effects of
grant-type funding for industrial R&D would impinge upon the shape or position of
firms’ MRR schedules, and so to identify whatever effects ensue as produced by shifts in
the MCC schedule.
Three main analytical cases have been delineated. In the first, it is assumed that
the firm is asset-constrained and thus faces a perfectly inelastic (vertical) MCC schedule
at its current level of R&D investment. The award of a subsidy in the form of a public
grant then shifts the MCC curve to the right, increasing the firm’s performance of R&D
by just the full amount of the subsidy. The second case postulates that the public grant
shifts an upward sloping MCC curve to the right, so that the amount of the incremental
increase in the amount of R&D the firm undertakes increases by less than the grant
award. The third case considers that the MCC schedule is perfectly elastic (horizontal) at
the pre-grant equilibrium, but is shifted downwards because the signal to equity holders
provided by the public grant award lowers the firm’s internal cost funds. The magnitude
of the increase in private R&D investment will then depend both the strength of the
“signal”, which is likely to vary directly with the relative size of the grant, and on the
slope of the firm's MRR schedule. Other things being equal, the "flatter" is the MRR
schedule, the greater will be the increase in the induced amount of private R&D
investment.
 Thus, only the last of these speculative situations envisages the possibility of a
complementarity effect of public grants for industrial R&D, i.e., one that would elicitDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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additional private R&D expenditures. Grants to firms for R&D are likely to be used in
ways that assure greater private appropriability of the benefits than is the norm for grant-
funded research in academic institutions, and similar non-profit research institutes. There
consequently may be justification for having presumed, in the foregoing analysis, that
contracts yield no positive spillover effects that would induce significantly increased
private R&D investment. But, by the same token, the same presumption should not be
extended to considerations of the impact of all public sector grant funding.
2.5 Short-run “net” impacts on private R&D: from micro- to macro-level effects
In general, the likely direction of net effects of public R&D contracts on private
R&D investment remains ambiguous. The previous discussion has reviewed an array of
channels at the micro-level, through which public contracts as well as grants would have
positive effects on the level of privately funded R&D activity. On the other side of the
ledger, however, two principal arguments have been advanced on behalf of supposing
that public expenditures for industrial R&D would exert a “crowding out” effect on
private R&D investment. The first of these is simply the micro-level displacement of
funding, previously discussed. This would occur where contracts are targeted in areas of
technological development that firms otherwise would still find it worthwhile
undertaking; the resulting alteration in the shape of the MRR schedule may be such as to
push it downwards and to the left.
The second argument introduces macro-level considerations. There is likely to be
upward pressure on the prices of R&D inputs when the provision of funding to a
particular firm or group of firms occurs in the context of an expanded government R&D
program that absorbs substantial scientific and engineering personnel, along with other
specialized materials and facilities. The resulting increased costs associated with the array
of potential private R&D projects implies a lowering of the MRR schedule; and, other
things being unchanged, that translates into a reduced level of business R&D investment.
Where will the balance be struck between the opposing forces arising from
increased public sector R&D expenditures at higher levels of aggregation -- i.e., inDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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technologically related industry groups, and the economy as a whole?
21 This question has
been recently examined analytically by David and Hall (1999). Their basic proposition is
simple: whenever the market supply of R&D inputs is less than infinitely elastic, as is
likely to be the case in the short-run, increased public sector demands for those resources
must displace private R&D spending, unless it gives rise to “spillovers” that also raise the
aggregate private derived demand for R&D inputs. In the simple two-sector model
developed by David and Hall (1999) the nature of the macro-level relationship between
private and public R&D investment depends upon four parameters of the system.
Complementarity, rather than substitution effects are likely to dominate where the
relative size of the public sector in total R&D input use is smaller, where the elasticity of
the labor supply of qualified R&D personnel is higher, where the grant-contract mix of
public outlays for R&D performance is skewed more towards the former, and where the
rate at which the private marginal yield of R&D decreases more gradually with increased
R&D expenditures.
Without having fully specified both the magnitudes of the elasticities, and the
shifts in schedules due to spillover effects, in an analogous manner for the
microeconomic framework depicted by Figure 1, the foregoing review of the static
qualitative arguments for and against complementarity leaves one unable to determine the
sign of the net impact of public subsidies on the level of business R&D expenditures. The
general point that the foregoing discussion does bring out clearly, however, is the
presence of identification problems due to the fact that the MRR and MCC curves may be
                                               
21 Attention should be called to the analytical difficulty of passing explicitly from the micro-level
framework of the previous subsections to the macro-level. In principle it would be possible to construct an
aggregate private marginal efficiency of R&D investment schedule, from the union of all the projects (each
with their individually perceived expected internal rates of return). As that might well involve duplicative
investments in some projects, it should be evident that the private expectations would generally not be
realized. The consistent aggregate private marginal efficiency of investment schedule would be lower, in
general; nevertheless it is likely to lie below the aggregate social marginal efficiency of investment
schedule. But the real difficulty lies in passing from the aggregate private MRR schedule to the aggregate
demand for R&D investment when firms are realistically heterogeneous. The distribution of projects is not
identical across firms, and neither do they all face the same MCC schedule. This means that there is
nothing to guarantee that a ranking of all the projects selected for funding by the private sector would
coincide with the ranking of the projects that would be selected by a central profit-maximizing agent
charged with allocating the private sector’s total R&D funding.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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shifting simultaneously. This must be dealt with if econometric studies are to succeed
either in providing reliable estimates for the critical underlying elasticity parameters, or
in simply ascertaining the sign of the net effect of public R&D contracts. It has been
pointed out that both fixed costs associated with R&D startup, and resource constraint
effects on input prices that are correlated with individual firms’ receipts of funding, may
be shifting the MCC schedule. By holding those effects essentially constant by the use of
an appropriate econometric specification, including proper instrumental variable, it
should be possible to evaluate the net impact of public R&D contracts on private R&D
investment demand. The identified effect would measure the net movement of the firm's
MRR schedule, holding opportunity cost of capital fixed.
2.6 “Dynamic” or long-run effects of R&D subsidies
Even though most of the empirical literature has been devoted to quantifying
these presumed short-run (“static”) effects, we should recognize at least two "dynamic"
or long-run effects that are partially the outcome of public R&D funding. First,
informational spillovers from the advance of public science and engineering knowledge,
much of which is made possible by government R&D activities, will likely shift the
firm's MRR schedule outward over time. Since new knowledge is the main source of new
technological opportunities, the outward shift of the MRR curve assumes that these
opportunities take the form of higher project returns. Of course, such effects would be felt
with variable lags and are likely to be localized among some subset of the underlying
projects. So, the relevant schedules would undergo changes in shape as well as position
and the impacts will not necessarily be felt symmetrically throughout the population of
firms.
A second dynamic effect stems from the training of new scientists and engineers.
There is a strong and important emphasis in the U.S. and U.K. public research enterprise
on training, particularly within the research universities. Due to the trend toward
increasingly heavy reliance upon foreign graduate students as research assistants on grant
funded academic research projects, one must not simply presume the existence of tightDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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coupling between training activities and the future availability of qualified research
personnel in the labor markets where such training occurred. But, insofar as there is a
lagged input supply response from expanded public funding of R&D (grants), this could
show up at the microeconomic level as an outward drift of the MRR schedule over time.
22
But, if one considers the situation in the market for industrial R&D personnel, it is more
natural to conceptualize the aggregate effect in terms of a downward shift of the labor
supply schedule. The latter would thus be a factor mitigating such demand-driven upward
pressures on real unit costs of R&D that were set in motion by the expansion of
government funding.  In general, then, the balance of the long-run dynamic effects seems
to favor the emergence at higher levels of aggregation of net complementarities, rather
than a relationship dominated by “crowding out”, or the substitution of public for private
R&D investment.
2.7 Endogeneity, and common latent variables effects
Using this simple investment framework to clarify the expected channels of
influence helps to formulate and evaluate the empirical "tests" that exist in the literature.
It does not, however, allow us to address the possible mutual interdependence of public
and private R&D expenditures. This may present an issue for econometric analysis, either
because of simultaneity and selection bias in the funding process, or because there are
omitted latent variables that are correlated with both the public and private R&D
investment decisions. Endogeneity due to selection biases in R&D grants and subsidized
loans to small and medium size firms has been addressed recently in the work of Busom
(1999) and Wallsten (1999), whereas the possibility of omitted time-constant firm effects
                                               
22 On the economic significance of the rising numerical importance of foreign graduate students and post-
doctoral fellows in university research systems, see Dasgupta and David (1994). There is substantial
evidence, most of it accumulated from surveys of company executives responsible for research and
development, that firms actively search for recent trainees of university departments that have successfully
drawn public funding for basic research; that they regard recent graduates as an important source of
practical knowledge about the use of new techniques. See, e.g., Levin et al. (1987), Pavitt (1991). It
remains unclear to what extent this public goods spillover effect via researcher training is equally
characteristic of university-based research supported by industry funds, and conducted under restrictions
typical of proprietary R&D.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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in the awarding of government R&D contracts was pointed out many years ago by
Lichtenberg (1984). Lichtenberg also remarked on the problem presented by the fact that
firms undertake a significant amount of preparatory R&D in order to qualify for
government contracts and grants: this may create a situation in which the firm's MRR
schedule already has shifted outward in anticipation of a public R&D contract or grant,
and consequently the firm's response to the award may be more difficult to detect in the
data.
More generally, it may well be that there are strong selectivity biases that lead
firms which have a recognized competence for certain kinds of R&D to receive public
contracts as well as to fund such activities with their own money. Beyond that, in cross-
section analyses at the industry level, a distinct but related econometric problem may
arise where both private and public investment decisions are responding to the same
latent variable, namely, the inter-industry variation in the “technological opportunity set.”
The possibility of exogenous changes in the state of the opportunities created for
commercially attractive innovation – such as those opened up by developments in fiber
optics, high-temperature superconductivity, or the availability of restriction enzyme
techniques for “gene-splicing” – may confound efforts to identify the causal impact of
public R&D allocations upon the pattern of private investment.
Even though the framework presented here has not undertaken to formalize these
and other, more “politically implicated” sources of endogeneity in public R&D
expenditures, it has assisted us in underscoring the need for empirical studies to be
explicit about their identifying assumptions, and to include proper "control" variables.
The foregoing discussion also has highlighted the point that public R&D contracts are
likely to have a much stronger immediate effect on the firms’ marginal returns schedule
than is the case with public R&D grants. For that reason alone, public contracts are more
difficult to evaluate because those effects are readily confounded with the many other
factors that shift the MRR schedule including the nature of changes in the production and
product technology, appropriability conditions, the type of product market competition,
and so on.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
25
As the previous discussion of identification problems may have suggested, to
undertake to estimate the magnitude of the effect of public R&D spending upon private
R&D investment at different levels of aggregation is tantamount to conducting rather
widely differing “experiments” in the hope of determining “the” response. Some
considerable doubt must surround the very idea that there is a universal relationship of
that kind, and so it will be better to avoid casual comparisons and juxtapositions of
findings, striving to compare like with like where that is feasible. Macro-level time-series
studies have to consider feedback effects operating through price movement in the
markets for R&D inputs, whereas in micro-level analyses the findings should reflect
“real” rather than nominal expenditure relationships between public and private R&D. At
least that would be so, once controls had been entered for time-effects (in the form of
year dummies). Of course, in saying this, we assume that there is substantial potential
mobility on the part of R&D personnel among firms, and industries. In other words, when
“the experiment” under analysis involves the provision of a subsidy for R&D conducted
by a particular firm, it is reasonable to assume that the firm faces a highly elastic supply
of R&D inputs, and therefore that input prices and unit costs cannot be materially
affected by the subsidy.
23 The implication is that the observed effect on the level of
private R&D spending should be somewhat weaker at the microeconomic level than that
found by studies conducted using aggregate data (since the effects in the former case are
real rather than nominal).
Nevertheless, at the lower level of aggregation there are likely to be additional
complications due to the presence of significant cross-sectional differences in
technological opportunity or innovation capabilities (“competences” in the terminology
preferred by the recent management literature). Some controls for “fixed effects” may be
appropriate in such cases. But, in studies based on firm- and industry-level and panel
data, over time the “innovation opportunity sets” may be undergoing differential
alterations among the various technological and market areas. Simple, fixed effects
                                               
23 This is precisely true only for the log-log specification, where the aggregate price effects are in the
constant term, or when the number of firms receiving subsidies is a small fraction of the total so that thereDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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methods are then likely to prove inadequate to the task, and more complex econometric
tactics would seem to be called for.
Thus alerted to the numerous underlying complexities that beset those in search of
a straightforward empirical answer to the question of whether “complementarity” or
“substitution” prevails in this domain, we may now be in a position to critically examine
the econometric findings which the literature presently has to offer.
The Empirical Literature: Review and Critique
Our survey is organized in subsections, distinguishing among the econometric
studies according to their choice of the unit of observation, and by the type of data
analyzed. Four types of observational units have been studied: line-of-business or
laboratory, firm, industry, and national (or domestic) economy. The typical econometric
approach is to regress some measure of private R&D on the government R&D, along
with some other "control" variables. When a positive coefficient on the public R&D
variable is found, this is interpreted as revealing the predominance of complementarity
between public and private investments. On the flip-side, a negative coefficient is taken
to imply that public R&D and private R&D are substitutes. In several studies, the authors
use the magnitude of the estimate to make statements to the effect that "a one dollar
increase in public R&D funding leads to an X dollar increase (decrease) in private R&D
investment." On the whole, however, the magnitudes of the published estimates are very
diverse.
24 In some instances they are very difficult to compare directly, owing to
variations in the specification of the estimated equation, and the absence of collateral
statistical information needed to calculate dimension-free parameter estimates, such as
                                                                                                                               
is no price effect in the cross section.
24 For example, Wallsten (1999) concludes that there is a one-for-one crowding-out of private investment,
whereas Robson (1993) concludes that there is a one-for-one stimulus of private R&D investment. To be
sure, these studies were not analyzing the same dataset.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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elasticities. Our summary tables present the estimated elasticity of private R&D with
respect to public R&D wherever it has been possible to obtain this magnitude.
To achieve appropriate comparability among the findings, we divide the studies
into the following four main groups, according to the nature of the statistical observations
used and the econometric approach followed:
(1) Pure cross-section studies at the micro level, where firms or industries with
different levels of government R&D funding are compared. Here it is crucial to control
for differences in demand conditions, technological opportunity, and appropriability.
(2) Panel data studies at the micro level within a given industry, in which there are
controls for time-invariant differences among firms -- each firm in effect serving as its
own control, so that the results reflect individual firms’ time-series responses to changes
in government funding.
(3) Aggregate or macroeconomic studies, where the response is identified by
changes in private R&D funding over time as a function of government R&D funding.
Here it is important to control for macroeconomic influences that may be driving both
variables. In addition, it is likely that results based on these studies will contain R&D
input supply effects of the sort that are identified by Goolsbee (1998), and David and Hall
(1999).
(4) Studies, either micro or macro, that attempt to control for the simultaneity
between private and public R&D spending using instrumental variables. It is probable
that the results from these studies will differ from those in the other studies if common
omitted variables are a problem.
The discussion in the previous section urges caution when interpreting the results
of some of these regression studies. For example, when we look across firms or industries
in a cross section, we are seeing a set of equilibrium choices for the level of R&D (R
* in
Figure 1), rather than tracing out the derived demand curve for R&D as a function of the
position of the MCC curve. In fact, each of the firms and industries in question is likely to
face a different demand curve for R&D investment, as well as a different MCC schedule.
In addition, some of the effects of the public support for R&D will be to shift orDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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otherwise change that curve. Many, but not all, researchers have attempted to control for
the variability in the MRR curve when estimating the relationship, and in what follows we
will try to assess the success of the approaches that they have taken in doing so.
Blank and Stigler (1957) suggested in their original formulation of the question
that the most efficient and direct way to test for a complementary or substitution
relationship is to analyze a sample of research programs over time within a "suitable"
sample of companies. Due to data limitations, however, they were forced to rely on a
cross-section of manufacturing firms in their analysis. Their method was to compare the
ratios of scientific workers to all employment for firms with and without government
contracts. For a total sample of 1,564 firms in 1951, they found that firms with public
contracts also had lower scientific personnel intensity working on private research. This
result supports "substitution," at least in the sense that public contracts were associated
with fewer research personnel on private projects. When Blank and Stigler changed the
sampling universe, however, and took it to be U.S. manufacturing firms engaged in any
R&D, public and/or private, they reported that "in general substitution is now almost
absent."
25 Finally, using their most reliable data for firms with more than 5,000
employees, they found evidence for complementarity. These results are consistent with
the view that although many individual firms may find it attractive to substitute
government funding for their own R&D budgets, the large firms are better able to take
advantage of complementarities, due to knowledge spillovers and pump-priming effects.
The latter may operate across lines-of-business and even standard industrial classification
lines, so that the size of those firms may really be a surrogate for the product
diversification that enables them to appropriate benefits from the less predictable range of
their R&D projects. Blank and Stigler, however, warned that their estimate based on
variation across firms and industries at a point in time could be seriously biased by other
sources of heterogeneity, for example, variations in technological conditions faced by
different firms.
                                               
25 Blank and Stigler (1957), p. 61.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
29
3.1 Line of business and laboratory studies
The subsequent research of Scott (1984) and Leyden et al. (1989, 1991), together
with very recent work using Norwegian data by Klette and Moen (1998), are the only
studies that follow Blank and Stigler's (1957) recommendation to look "below" the firm
level. For each of these studies, Table 1 lists the sample used, the econometric
methodology and type of data, the form of the private R&D variable to be explained, the
form of the public R&D explanatory variable, as well as the "net" findings reported by
the authors.
Scott (1984) performs a cross-sectional analysis on FTC line-of-business data for
437 firms in 259 four-digit industries. He finds that private R&D is positively associated
with government financed R&D using both a restricted intensity version of the
relationship, and a log-level version. In both cases, his estimates are robust to the
inclusion of firm dummy variables and four-digit industry dummy variables. The results
also hold up whether or not firms that have zero company financed R&D are included
from the sample. As is the case for many of the studies surveyed here, his analysis may
be biased because of endogeneity between public and private R&D, due to omitted
variables that drive both sets of funding decisions. At least part of the "below-firm”
variation across lines-of-business probably is attributable to variation in technological
opportunities and appropriability conditions that are affecting the marginal returns.
Scott’s use of industry dummies should capture some of these omitted variables. But, the
recent work of Trajtenberg (1989) and Toole (1999) suggests that variation in
technological opportunities is very important even at the product class level.
Leyden et al. (1989) and Leyden and Link (1991), develop a more elaborate
structural model in order to provide insight into the empirical relationship between public
and private R&D. Since the approach of these two studies is very similar, we will focus
on the Leyden and Link’s (1991) empirical results. The authors estimate a three-equation
system using 3-stage least squares, using a cross-section of firm R&D laboratory data for
1987. Their endogenous variables are laboratory total private R&D budget, laboratory
knowledge sharing effort, and government total spending to acquire technical knowledge.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
30
For each lab, total government spending is defined broadly to include government
contracts, grants, and the value of government financed equipment and facilities.
Leyden and Link’s reduced form equations include the following predetermined
variables: (1) a dummy variable indicating that the lab has cooperative sharing
arrangements; (2) a dummy variable indicating that the lab does basic research; (3) a
dummy variable indicating that the lab is oriented toward biological or chemical research;
(4) the 2-digit industry level R&D/Sales ratio; and (5) an interaction term between the
R&D/Sales ratio and the presence of cooperative sharing arrangements. The excluded
exogenous variables in the private R&D equation are essentially the dummy of bio/chem
research and the dummy for basic research (the dummy for cooperative sharing
arrangements is present in the equation, multiplying the industry R&D to sales, so it is
not adding any identification).
The regressions model allows government R&D to influence the private R&D
budget directly, as well as indirectly through the lab's knowledge-sharing activities.
Further, the authors account for potential simultaneity of private and public funding
decisions by using the predicted values from a first stage reduced form regression as
instrumental variables. They find a positive and significant coefficient on the government
R&D in both their private R&D and knowledge sharing equations. Accounting for
various feedback effects, this implies an elasticity of 0.34 between private and public
R&D. Since in this study identification of the effect of government R&D on private
spending comes primarily from the comparison of labs of different types, it is not
surprising that it turns out to be fairly weak.
A different approach is taken in a new study by Klette and Moen (1998), based on
panel data on lines of business in Norwegian high technology firms. Specifically, they
looked at the effects of government matching grants in the electronics and electrical
equipment sector on the R&D undertaken in the lines of business between 1982 and
1995. This study is one of the few to control for the potential endogeneity of receiving aDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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grant that arises from firm self-selection into the program.
26 Klette and Moen find that
government R&D is complementary to private R&D, in the sense that the lines of
business do not reduce their R&D effort, but that no additional R&D is induced beyond
the level that would have been performed anyway. That is, the 50 percent that the firm
has to put up to receive the grant comes out of their normal R&D budget. Because the
authors have a fairly long panel, they are able to look more closely at the dynamic effects
of this R&D subsidy program and this yields their most interesting finding: the
government subsidy does appear to induce a permanent increase in the level of the line of
business R&D.
3.2 Firm-level studies
A summary of the firm level studies can be found in Table 2. Hamberg (1966)
was the first researcher to use a regression approach on firm level cross-sectional data to
address the relationship between public R&D and private R&D. Within the context of a
broader exploration of firm R&D activity, Hamberg included a government R&D
variable defined to be the total value of Department of Defense contracts divided by gross
fixed assets. Separating his sample of 405 firms into industry groups, he regressed the
firm's proportion of private R&D employment on its government contracts and other
variables for each industry using ordinary least squares. He reported that the government
contracts are positively related to private R&D for six out of eight industries (four are
significant) and negatively but insignificant for the other two. The four industries
showing complementarity are: (1) industrial chemicals; (2) electronic components and
communications equipment; (3) other electrical equipment; and (4) office machines. A
surprising result was that the coefficient on Defense Department contracts was positive
but not significant for the aircraft and missiles industry, because this industry had nearly
90% of its R&D funded by defense contracts during the sample period. Exploration of the
timing of the response to these contracts failed to overturn this result. Note, however, that
                                               
26 See Lichtenberg (1988) and Busom (1999), which are discussed in section 4.2, and Wallsten (1999) for
other studies that make this correction.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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David and Hall (1999) show that a weak response of private R&D spending to public
R&D is more likely when the government share of total R&D spending is large (in a
specialized technological or labor market area), or when government R&D does not
enhance private productivity very much. Both conditions may well apply in the case of
this industry (particularly the former).
Hamberg's (1966) analysis represented a step forward in two important ways.
First, he focused on DOD contracts awarded to individual industry groups. The
institutional homogeneity of the funding agency and the industry group help limit
potential omitted variables bias from other sources of variation like technological
opportunities. Second, he included an impressive combination of control variables such
as profits, sales, depreciation, gross investment, and a lag of R&D personnel. As we saw
in Section 3, these variables help hold constant other factors that may be shifting the
firm's marginal returns and cost of funds schedules. However, the cost of the
homogeneity of his sample is a small sample size for each regression. His largest industry
group had only thirty-four firms.
Howe and McFetridge (1976) conduct a careful analysis of the impact of
Canadian public R&D incentive grants on Canadian private R&D investment. Canadian
incentive grants are a cost-sharing arrangement in which public funds are used to support
half of the total cost of a private R&D project that the government has decided to support.
Motivating their specification using the same investment framework described in Section
3, the authors estimate a reduced form model of private R&D intensity on government
incentive grants and other variables. They use a sample of 81 firms over the period 1967-
1971 separated into three industry groups. As in Hamberg (1966), this helps protect
against biased estimates stemming from inter-industry differences in product
characteristics, technology, appropriability, and other factors. They find a positive
coefficient on public incentive grants for all three industries; however, it is significant
only for the electrical industry.
Higgins and Link (1981) and Link (1982) analyze how the composition of private
R&D investment responds to public R&D support. Using a cross-section of 174David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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manufacturing firms in 1977, Higgins and Link (1981) find that the percentage of private
R&D investment devoted to research falls as the firm receives more public R&D funds.
Although they interpret this as evidence for crowding-out, it should be remembered that
this is only one portion of a firm’s R&D budget. In fact, in an expanded version of this
study, Link (1982) finds that federal R&D stimulates total private R&D intensity. When
private R&D investment is decomposed into basic, applied, and development
components, Link finds that public R&D reduces private basic research intensity. Public
funds, however, stimulate private development intensity and have no significant effect on
private applied research intensity. While both Higgins and Link (1981) and Link (1982)
include control variables accounting for firm profits, diversification, and high technology
orientation, their results are probably affected by unobserved inter-industry variation.
Nonetheless, these studies attest to the important point that the type of public R&D
support matters for the private R&D investment decision. The distinction made between
public R&D contracts and grants in Section 3 is based on the same observation.
Lichtenberg (1984, 1987, 1988) has stressed the econometric issues involved in
the analysis of the relationship between public contract R&D and private R&D
investment. He has employed a demand and supply framework (similar in spirit to the
micro-level investment framework presented here) in order to make two basic points:
first, that public R&D contracts should be treated as endogenous at the firm level; second,
that sales to government are more R&D intensive and have an effect on private marginal
returns that should be included in the specification. In his 1984 paper, Lichtenberg also
suggests that the failure of previous studies to account for time constant and unobserved
firm characteristics has led to an upward bias on the coefficient estimates. Using data on
a cross-section of firms in three different time periods, he presents regression results for
private R&D intensity in both level and first-difference specifications (i.e., estimates that
control for permanent differences across firms). The mostly positive and significant
coefficients on public R&D become negative and significant in the latter regressions,
which implies that the observed complementarity was due to firm-level differences in
R&D intensities that are correlated with the award of public R&D contracts. Increases orDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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decreases in public R&D funding within the firm were not associated with increases or
decreases of private funding. As in all such differenced regressions, however, the
potential for downward bias due to measurement error in the independent variable must
be kept in mind.
The subsequent Lichtenberg papers (1987, 1988) address the issues posed by the
tendency of federal procurement demand to concentrate more R&D-intensive products,
and the potential endogeneity of federal contracts. His 1987 paper combines firm data
from Compustat and the Federal Procurement Data System to construct a panel of 187
firms over the period 1979-1984. He demonstrates that the value of government contracts
variable becomes insignificant once government purchases are included separately in the
regression equation.
Using a sample of 169 firms from the same database, Lichtenberg (1988)
proceeds to further partition federal contracts into “competitive” and “non-competitive.”
While his results show a positive and significant government R&D coefficient for the
total and "within" OLS regressions, the coefficient becomes negative and significant
when he accounts for endogeneity using as an instrumental variable potential government
contracts for products that the firm produces. It is important to note that the government
sales variable in the regression includes the value of government contracts. As he makes
clear, his results imply that there is no additional effect of government contracts beyond
their impact on the firm's marginal returns. As opposed to substitution, it would appear
that what Lichtenberg has identified is that the primary impact of government contracts
on private R&D investment works though their effect on the firm's private marginal
returns, rather than on the firm's marginal cost of funds schedule.
Wallsten (1999), Busom (1999), and Toivanen et al. (1998) are the most recent
firm-level studies on the public/private R&D relationship. Wallsten focuses on the effects
of the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR). This is a competitive
grant program designed to target A&D subsidies to smaller businesses, and Wallsten was
able to collect data on firms that have won SBIR awards, firms that applied but were
rejected, and firms that were eligible to apply but did not apply. His sample of awardeesDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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comes from the data systems of eleven different governmental agencies and covers a
variety of industrial areas over the 1990-1992 time period. In order to correct for the
potential endogeneity of the public funding decision on the firm's R&D response,
Wallsten uses a three equation system intended to model the award granting process as
well as the firm's response. Estimating the system by 3SLS and using the total SBIR
budget from which firms could have won awards as his instrument, he finds that the
number of SBIR awards won by a firm has a positive but insignificant effect on firm
employment. In a separate set of regressions, he finds that the number and value of SBIR
awards significantly reduces firm R&D expenditure. In these latter regressions, however,
Wallsten is forced to analyze only publicly-owned firms and this reduces his sample of
firms from 481 observations to 81 observations.  Based on the typical size of an SBIR
award, Wallsten concludes that public grants displace private R&D investment on a
nearly one-for-one basis, although it must be noted that this finding pertains only to the
publicly-owned recipients of such funding.
Busom (1999) analyzes the effect of Spanish government subsidized loans on
private R&D expenditure and employment using a sample of Spanish firms. Like
Wallsten (1999), Busom is careful to address the potential endogeneity of the public
funding decision stemming from selection bias in the grant process. She explores this
problem by implementing a two-step procedure that predicts the probability of
participation in the program in the first step, and includes a correction for selection in the
second step. Using a sample of 147 Spanish firms in 1988, Busom finds that the
hypothesis of no selection bias cannot be rejected, even thought the legitimacy of pooling
participant and non-participant firms is rejected by a Chow test. Unfortunately, her data
does not include the amount of the R&D subsidy, only the fact that it exists, so she is
unable to provide a quantitative estimate of the complementarity or crowding-out effect.
She finds that on average, receiving a government R&D subsidy induces more private
R&D effort than would be predicted on the basis of an R&D effort equation for the
“controls-firms” (those that did not receive a subsidy), when corrections are made for
sample selection biases. For 30 percent of the firms, however,full crowding-out remainedDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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a possibility that could not be ruled out by the data. It will be interesting to see results
based on data from this Spanish program in the future, especially those that reveal the
amount as well as the presence of the R&D subsidies.
In addition to the typical econometric formulations that regress some measure of
private R&D on public R&D, an increasing number of alternative and more indirect
approaches have been pursued in recent years. Since these papers are less direct than
those considered above, the following brief resumés report only the "bottomline" from
these efforts. The interested reader is urged to consult the original studies for more detail.
First, Irwin and Klenow (1996) analyze a sample of U.S. semiconductor firms to find out
how private R&D investment responds when firms participate in a government supported
R&D consortium. By finding that membership reduces private R&D investment, the
authors suggest that membership eliminates the need for duplicative R&D. Lerner (1999)
looks at the long-run impact of the SBIR program on firm sales and employment. He
finds that these government grants have only a limited positive impact, except in those
areas where there also is substantial venture capital activity. The specification, however,
does not allow one to distinguish whether the presence of venture capital fund exerts its
effect through shifting the MCC schedule, or whether it is really a surrogate for
technological opportunity set differences, i.e., proxying the attraction of biotechnology
and software innovations that can be pursued by small firms.
Cockburn and Henderson (1998) analyze the co-authorship of scientific papers
between public and private institutions in the U.S. They find that private firm
organization and research productivity are positively related to the fraction of co-
authorship with academic institutions, which are largely supported by federal funds. In a
closely related study, Narin et al. (1997) examine the contribution of public science to
industrial technology using patent citation measures. Their research finds a strong link
between industrial patents and publicly supported research. Feldman and Lichtenberg
(1998) report finding that for a sample of European Union member countries there is a
strong positive relationship between the number of private institutions that specialize in a
particular scientific field and the number of public institutions specializing in the sameDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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scientific field. They interpret this result as evidence of complementarity between public
and private investments in R&D.
3.3 Industry-level studies
There have only been a handful of industry level studies on the relationship
between public R&D and private R&D investment, probably because at this level of
aggregation the absence of a clear “experiment” is most glaring. The most important
proximate source of variation in R&D intensity across firms is differences in industry,
and this is as true of public R&D as of private R&D expenditures. Therefore we should
not be surprised if industry-level studies show complementarity between the two, nor
should we conclude anything other than the fact that some industries have greater
technological opportunity than others.
The industry studies are summarized in Table 3. The Globerman (1973) and
Buxton (1975) papers use industry cross-sectional variation and find complementarity.
However, these studies use very small samples, 15 data points in Globerman (1973) and
11 data points of Buxton (1975). Larger samples and better specifications can be found in
Goldberg (1979), Lichtenberg (1984), and Levin and Reiss (1984). Each of these studies
use NSF data arranged as a panel with observations on a cross-section of industries over
time. Goldberg (1979), following a neoclassical investment approach, regresses private
R&D per unit of output on both current and lagged federal R&D per unit of output, plus
industry dummies and other control variables. He finds that current federal R&D has a
negative and significant coefficient while federal R&D lagged one period has a positive
and significant coefficient. The sum of these coefficients indicates a small
complementarity effect of federal R&D on private R&D investment.
Lichtenberg (1984), on the other hand, finds that public R&D reduces private
R&D investment and employment at the industry level. His preferred specification
regresses the change in private R&D investment (or employment) on the change in
contemporaneous and lagged federal government-performed R&D (or employment), plus
industry dummies, and time dummies. For federal R&D, he concludes that an additionalDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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dollar crowds out eight cents of private R&D investment. Introducing better controls for
cross-industry variation in technological opportunity and appropriability, however, would
tend to removed the upward bias in the estimated coefficient and thus reinforce the
indications of crowding-out in this study.
Levin and Reiss’s (1984) paper stands out as the most ambitious industry level
study in the literature. They develop a structural equation system that relates an industry's
concentration, R&D and advertising intensities to the industry's structure of demand,
technological opportunities, and appropriability conditions. In their model, government
R&D intensity enters both as a measure of technological opportunity and as a
determinant of appropriability conditions. Rather than treat government R&D as
exogenous, however, the authors specify a reduced form equation that models
government R&D intensity as a function of the government share of industry sales (both
defense and non-defense) and of the extent of R&D “borrowing” via capital purchases
from other industries, along with the opportunity and appropriability variables. Using two
stage least squares, Levin and Reiss find that government R&D intensity has a positive
and significant effect on private R&D intensity. In all specifications, the authors find a
complementary relationship with a magnitude that implies each additional dollar of
public funds stimulates from seven to seventy-four cents of private R&D investment.
A handful of carefully executed case studies may be noticed here, all of which
report finding a complementary relationship between public R&D and private R&D
investment. The best known study, Mansfield and Switzer (1984), uses interview data
collected from R&D executives in private firms. Their study focuses on R&D targeted on
energy technologies done in the electrical equipment, petroleum, primary metals, and
chemical industries. The authors combine the responses from twenty-five firms to
calculate the change in company-financed R&D per dollar of government-financed R&D.
They uncover an asymmetric relationship in which the effect of an increase in
government R&D has a different magnitude and time profile than a decrease in
government R&D. An additional dollar of federal R&D stimulates an additional six cents
in the first two years and nothing thereafter. A one-dollar decrease, on the other hand,David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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stimulates a twenty-five cent fall in private R&D in the first two years and an additional
nineteen-cent decrease in the third year. Support for a complementary public-private
R&D investment relationship also has emerged from studies of aircraft and civilian space
technology, by Mowery (1985) and Hertzfeld (1985).
3.4 Aggregate studies
We have identified seven aggregate macro econometric studies of the
public/private R&D relationship in the recent journal literature. These papers are
summarized in Table 4. Not only was the Levy and Terleckyj (1983) paper the first of the
macro level studies but it remains the most definitive of its kind. Using NSF data for the
United States over the period of 1949-1981, the authors explore the impact of
government contract and "other" R&D on private R&D investment and productivity.
Their main findings are: (1) government contract R&D is positively and significantly
associated with private R&D investment and productivity; and (2) "other" government
R&D has no contemporaneous relationship, but does complement private R&D with a lag
of three years, while reducing private productivity with a lag of nine years. Even after
correcting for government reimbursement of certain private R&D overhead expenditures,
Levy and Terleckyj find that an additional dollar of public contract research added to the
stock of government R&D has the effect of inducing an additional twenty-seven cents of
private R&D investment. Moreover, Terleckyj (1985) shows that this effect remains after
accounting for the R&D intensity of governmental demand, to which attention was drawn
by Lichtenberg (1984). Yet, Lichtenberg (1987), also using NSF time-series data for the
U.S., reports finding that when allowance is made for the higher R&D intensity of sales
to the federal government, there is no additional impact from public R&D expenditures
on private R&D investment. That study by Lichtenberg, however, does not replicate Levy
and Terleckyj’s (1983) inclusion of controls for other determinants of the aggregate level
of private investment and productivity, nor does it follow them in defining public and
private R&D as stock variables. Although Levy and Terleckyj’s approach in the latter
regard is a conceptual improvement, because one would expect the effects of R&DDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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investment to persist for longer than one year, there is an practical econometric difficulty
with its implementation: working with stocks, rather than the annual flows, induces very
strong positive serial correlation in the dependent and independent variables of the
regression model.
Robson (1993) and Diamond (1998) also conduct aggregate time-series analyses
using NSF data for the United States, but they restrict their focus to examining the effects
of basic research. This type of federal funding is of the “infrastructure” variety which can
be expected to shift out the marginal product curve for private R&D; hence, as the
analysis in David and Hall (1999) shows, in the long run it is more likely to increase
private and total investment in R&D rather than reduce them. Robson (1993) focuses his
attention on how private basic research investment responds to various forms of federally
funded R&D, separating the aggregate into basic research and government outlays for
applied/development R&D performed in industry. Using data for the period of 1956-
1988, he regresses the change in private basic research investment on the change in
federal basic research expenditures, the level of federal applied/development R&D, the
change in private applied/development R&D investment, and the government/non-
government ratio of industry sales. Robson finds that both the change in federal basic and
the level of federal applied/development research have positive and significant
coefficients in this regression equation. Diamond (1998) similarly uses NSF data for the
earlier portion of the same period (1953-1969) to examine the impact of changes in
federal basic research expenditures on changes in basic research spending by industry.
He, too, finds a positive and significant coefficient on the federal spending variable.
Thus, both of the foregoing studies conclude that at the aggregate level the
overall, net relationship between public and private investments for basic research is one
of complements, not substitutes. Indeed, the estimated the elasticity reported by Diamond
(1998) is very high, roughly unitary. It should be noted, however, that as these results are
obtained from the co-variation in the aggregate time-series observations, they could be
reflecting the correlated effects of other macroeconomic variables. Neither study makesDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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use of instrumental variables to control for the influence of the U.S. business cycle and
shifts in overall federal fiscal policy during the period in question.
As an alternative to attempting to control for the possible influences of those
omitted variables, a different approach to dealing with the endogeneity problem that is
likely to plague time-series analyses of a single economy is available where one can
make use of cross-country panel data. Indeed, there have been some recent attempts to
exploit this possible route to identifying the nature of the public-private R&D
relationship, by employing aggregate-level time-series observations for OECD countries
in panel form. Starting with a sample of nine OECD countries for the period of 1963-
1984, Levy (1990) works with a specification that distinguishes among three geographic
regions within which it is assumed that there would be strong spillovers of the effects of
public R&D expenditures: the US, Europe, and Japan. He therefore regresses national
private R&D investment on aggregate public R&D investment in each region, aggregate
regional GDP, and individual country dummy variables. Among the nine countries in his
panel, Levy (1990) finds that five countries exhibit significant overall public-private
complementarity effects, whereas two countries show signficant substitution effects. The
reasons for the differences remain unexplored, which is understandable in view of the
restricted size of the cross-national sample, but further progress along these lines may be
possible in the near future. Research by von Tunzelmann and Martin (1998) has
ambitiously undertaken to develop the R&D time-series for some twenty-two OECD
countries over the 1969-1995 period. Exploratory analysis of this data by von
Tunzelmann and Martin is still in progress, but they report preliminary results of using
the panel data to fit a linear model relating changes in industry-financed R&D to the
changes in the government-financed R&D, and the previous levels of both private and
public R&D expenditures, allowing country-specific differences in all the coefficients. In
only 7 of the 22 countries do they find that changes in government funded R&D have any
significant impact on changes in industry-funded R&D, with the sign being positive in 5David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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of those seven cases.
27  Rather more illuminating results are likely to be obtained by
exploiting the availablity of this enlarged panel to estimate models whose specifications
take account of cross-country differences in the set of structural characteristics that David
and Hall (1999) suggests would affect the sign of the aggregate reduced-form relationship
between public and private R&D investments.
Because it addresses an essentially macro-level effect, we also should take notice
here of Goolsbee’s (1998) investigation of the direct labor market impacts of U.S.
government R&D funding. Using NSF data on scientists and engineers (S&E), Goolsbee
finds that increases in expenditures for public R&D have a significant effect in raising
average S&E wages. He suggests that a major fraction of public R&D yields windfall
gains to S&E workers; and that, by raising the cost of technically-skilled workers used in
private R&D laboratories, government funding tends to “crowd out” private R&D. As we
have noted in our earlier discussion (see sections 2.5-2.6) of the R&D input market
effects of an exogenous increase -- in either public or private investment levels -- the
implication of findings such as Goolsbee’s is that aggregate-level econometric estimates
are likely to overestimate the real response of private R&D investment to public R&D
expenditures, because they will include the positive price effects. This may help to
explain why the macro-level estimates implied by the findings in Goolsbee’s study tend
to be more strongly in favor of complementarity than the general run of the micro-level
elasticity estimates surveyed here.
28
3.5 Micro-level impacts of public R&D performed by non-profit organizations
Adams (1998) and Toole (1999) appear to be the only econometric studies on the
relationship between publicly funded/non-profit performed research and private R&D
                                               
27 The countries exhibiting complementarity in this respect are: Germany, the Netherlands, New Zeland,
Switzerland and the U.S.A. But the preliminary results overall are decidedly mixed: leaving aside the three
countries (among the 22 ) for which the coefficient on changes in government-financed R&D is both non-
significant and close to zero, in 10 of the remaining 18 cases the coefficient is found to be positive.
28 See David and Hall (1999) for further discussion of the quantitative implications of Goolsbee’s (1998)
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investment in the manufacturing sector.
29 These two studies, however, have very different
objectives and use different data and specifications. Adams (1990) is interested in the
factors that mediate research spillovers between industrial labs and outside firms and
academic institutions. By separating funds devoted to learning activities from the overall
R&D budget, Adams is able to investigate the dependence of the level of private learning
R&D upon the stocks of industry R&D and federally funded academic R&D. Using
survey data from 208 industrial laboratories in the chemical, machinery, transportation
equipment, and electrical equipment industries, he finds that publicly supported academic
research does not stimulate industrial learning R&D, although it does stimulate greater
expenditures on learning about academic R&D. Even though this line inquiry is on-going,
econometric research that separates private R&D investment into different categories, in
the same spirit as that of Link (1982), can be expected to improve our understanding of
how overall private R&D budgets respond when there are changes in the distribution of
public funding for R&D performed by different types of research organizations.
Toole (1999) explores the complementarity between private R&D investment in
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, and publicly funded research performed outside the
industry, in public and private non-profit institutes and universities. Since this type of
public research affects the private marginal returns to R&D and not the private cost of
funds, it is important to hold constant other factors that may shift the private MRR
schedule. The analysis attempts to control for these other factors constant in three ways.
First, restricting the analysis to a single industry serves to eliminates a major source of
demand shifts arising from the variation in technological opportunities and
appropriability conditions. Second, the use of a new and detailed database on public
R&D grants and contracts, allows Toole to separate both public and private R&D
investment expenditures into seven medical technology classes. This is important since
the private marginal returns schedule will differ by the specific technologies and the
                                               
29 The papers by Jaffe (1989) and Ward and Dranove (1995) are part of a broader definition of this
literature. Jaffe (1989) looks at geographically mediated spillovers and does not differentiate between
publicly and privately funded academic research. Ward and Dranove (1995), on the other hand, separate
public and private R&D funding but do not do not differentiate between performers of public R&D.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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changes in the state of the art in those technological areas. Third, public and private R&D
investment data are matched by technology class over a fifteen-year period to construct a
panel data set. This permits use of an econometric specification that includes both
technology class dummies and year dummies. Differences in the marginal returns across
classes are picked up by the class dummy variables while R&D price changes and other
trends over time are captured by the year dummies.
With additional control variables for regulatory stringency and a correction for the
endogeneity of expected profitability, Toole (1999) finds that public basic research
stimulates private R&D investment after a lag. For the estimated lag of six to eight years,
the elasticity of private R&D investment with respect to the stock of public basic research
lies in the range of 0.46 to 0.53. While Toole's analysis does not use an econometric
correction for the potential endogeneity of public R&D funding, that is not likely to be a
serious problem in this particular context. Unlike the program-oriented analyses by
Wallsten (1999) and Busom (1999), there is no program selection bias affecting the for-
profit firm's response to this publicly supported R&D. Moreover, other sources of
endogeneity, such as simultaneity bias and omitted technological opportunity variables,
are minimized given the estimated lag in the relationship, and technology class structure
of the model. This much having been said in favor of the use of industry level technology
classes, Toole’s approach does assume that firm effects are less important than
technology class effects. That well may be the case for the more dynamic high-
technology industries, but it is less likely to hold for more mature non-science based
industries. It would be revealing, therefore, to carry out a similarly detailed analysis at the
firm level, but, unfortunately, the distribution of proprietory R&D investments among
specific technological areas is not information that businesses are likely to disclose until
it ceases to be regarded as having any future commercial relevance. This, then, is a line of
inquiry that probably will have to be left for the econometrically inclined economic
historians.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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4. Summary and Conclusions
The discussion introducing this survey elaborated a standard unifying framework
within which to examine R&D investment at the microeconomic level. With its help we
sought to identify the distinctive channels through which the provision of government
subsidies would affect the behavior of business firms, associating those effects with shifts
either of the firm’s marginal rate of return (MRR) schedule, or of its marginal cost of
capital (MCC) schedule, or of both schedules.
The implications of the firm-level analysis was compared with the insights
obtained from a heuristic structural model of relationships that would obtain at the
macro-level, drawing for the latter on the analysis recently presented by David and Hall
(1999).  Recognition of the existence of heterogeneities and asymmetries among firms
was seen to render it invalid to try to pass from the micro- to the macro-analytic level
directly, by separate aggregation of the MRR and MCC schedules and solution of the
industry, sectoral or economy-wide equilibrium. This is a difficult quite distinct from the
problems arising from the interdependence of enterprise behavior in imperfectly
competitive markets.  It necessitates the formulation of a separate macro-level
framework, such as that of David and Hall (1999), in which the effects of funding upon
the prices of R&D inputs, as well as informational spillovers, can be represented for both
the short-run and long-run cases.
 In the development of this part of the exposition, simplicity, rather than novelty
was the criterion to which the discussion adhered. Its two immediate purposes were to
highlight the principal econometric issues would need to be addressed by the ensuing
critical review, and to provide guidance in interpreting the empirical findings reported by
the quite diverse array of studies that compose the literature on this topic. Insofar as those
goals were met, we believe that a strong initial case has been made for the value of
paying greater attention to structural modeling; certainly, for taking structural modeling
further than has been the norm for research contributions addressing the issue of whetherDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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or not public funding of R&D encourages, or simply substitutes for R&D investments
made by business enterprises.
This survey deliberately has eschewed an effort to arrive at any definitive
empirical conclusions regarding the sign and magnitude of the relationship between
public and private R&D. In doing so, we have acknowledged the multiplicity of the
approaches to this question that appear in the literature, and the consequent lack of
immediate comparability between studies conducted at differing levels of aggregation,
and treating a variety of modes and purposes in government funding of R&D.
Quite apart from the difficulties of rendering the results of those studies in a form
that would permit ready quantitative comparisons, the heterogeneity of experience
created by the application of institutionally different subsidy programs to diverse
industries and areas of technology provides strong grounds for doubting the usefulness of
searching for “the” right answer. Beyond our commentary on the individual
contributions, what, then, it is possible to extract, by way of a valid and intelligible
overview of the present state of empirical knowledge on this question?
Guided by insights from the analytical framework, our examination of the
literature proceeded by comparing and contrasting empirical studies that first were
grouped according to the level of aggregation at which the relationship between publicly-
and privately-funded R&D was examined. In addition an effort was made to distinguish
between findings pertaining to the impact of government contracts, and those concerned
with other (grant) provisions of funding for R&D. Further, the discussion of the
publications arrayed in our comparison tables (1-4) noted those contributions that rest
exclusively on data about U.S. experience. The latter comprise about two thirds of the 33
sets of results assembled for examination, and keeping in mind this dimension of
heterogeneity in the sources of “the evidence” – in addition to that arising from variations
in “level of aggregation” dimension -- would seem to be pertinent for a number of
reasons. Among the more obvious and straight-forward of these should be mentioned the
fact that observations drawn from the third quarter of the century carry considerably
greater weight in the body of U.S. evidence than is the case for the studies of experienceDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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elsewhere. The comparatively greater importance of defense (and aeronautic and space)
contracts for R&D in the total of U.S. government funding for industrially performed
R&D, also is a differentiating characteristic that may be significant.
This suggests we should re-consider the shape of literature explicitly from those
two taxonomic perspectives. And, indeed, several striking features of the distribution of
overall findings are exposed by the simple tabulation in Table 5, in which our sample of
studies are arrayed according to the level of aggregation, and national source of data.  As
may be seen from the table, exactly one third of the cases report that public R&D funding
behaves as a substitute for private R&D investment. This result is far more prevalent
among the studies conducted at the line-of-business and firm level, than among those
carried out at the industry and higher aggregation levels -- where the relative frequency
approaches one-half (9/19).
A second pattern that stands out from the table is that whereas five-sixths of the
studies based on data from countries other than the U.S. report overall complementarity,
the corresponding proportion among those based purely on U.S. data is only four-
sevenths (1 - 9/21). That has some bearing upon a third feature of interest in Table 5: the
regional contrast in the findings that emerges within the group of studies conducted at
and below the level of the firm. Here one sees a marked difference between the
distribution of the U.S.-based findings and the much higher relative frequency with which
complementarity is reported by analysts working exclusively from U.S. evidence.
It may well be that this latter contrast is in part reflecting underlying differences
between the character of the U.S. federal R&D contracts and awards, and the purposes
and terms of the more recent European government programs of funding for industrial
R&D. It should be noted, however, that the frequency with which “complementarity”
appears among U.S.-based studies pertaining to experience at the line-of-business and
firm levels cannot be regarded as being anomalously low; not at least when it is viewed
within the overall context of the distribution of findings summarized by Table 5.
30
                                               
30 Quite the contrary. This can be seen by taking the analysis of the figure in Table 5 one step further.
Consider that the proportion of “complementarity” results among all the U.S.-based studies is (4/7), and theDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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Table 5
Summary Distribution of Econometric Studies of the Relationship
between Public and Private R&D Investment
___________________________________________________________________
  Studies reporting   Total number
 “net” substitution     of studies
___________________________________________________________________
 Level of aggreation: Firm and Lower 
a
    Number of studies surveyed     9 19
Based on U.S. data only   7 12
Based on other countries’ data     2  7
Level of aggreation: Industry and Higher 
b
    Number of studies surveyed     2 14
Based on U.S. data only   2  9
Based on other countries’ data   0  5
All levels of aggregation 




a  The findings in Toivanen & Nininen (1998) for large firms and small firms each are counted
here as a separate study.
 
b  Adams (1998), and Toole (1999) are included here, and are assigned following the text
discussion in section 3.5.
 c  The assignment of von Tunzelmann & Martin (1998) follows Table 4, although these results are
preliminary. 
Our analysis directed particular attention to the differences one should expect to
find in the results of studies that are conducted at different levels of aggregation. It was
pointed out that the effects of unobserved inter-industry differences in the technological
opportunity set are likely to induce positive covariation in the public and private
components of total industry-level R&D expenditures. Further, at the aggregate level the
                                                                                                                               
fraction of all lower aggregation level studies that report complementarity is (11/19). Under independence
of the two effects, therefore, we might expect (4/12) of the U.S. studies based on line-of-business and firm
level data to have reported “complementarity”; whereas the observed frequency is (5/12). This is not aDavid, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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likely positive effect on R&D input prices of expanded government funding also
contributes to the appearance of complementary movements in the private and public
components of nominal R&D expenditures. One may note, then, that the summary
tabulation of results that we have reviewed (in Table 5) conform well with these
theoretical expectations. Complementarity appears more prevalent, and substitution
effects all but vanish among the subgroup of studies that have investigated this
relationship at the industry and national economy levels.
Is this to be read as telling us something about the strength of the positive impacts
that inter-firm and inter-industry spillovers, through knowledge and tangible R&D input
markets, have upon the expected private rates of return on company-funded R&D? Or is
it reflecting some combination of the endogenous responses of both government and
business allocation decisions to opportunities being open by fundamental scientific and
technological advances, and the “R&D price effects” of the competition generated by
private and public funders for limited scientific and engineering resources?
At present these questions remain open, and no less important than they were
when Blank and Stigler (1957) launched the search for answers. Progress towards
resolving them will require further, micro-level studies that make a serious effort to
control for the effects of cross-section and temporal variations in technological
opportunities, along with other sources of variation affecting expected private rates of
return. To the extent that government policies affecting public R&D funding are
correlated with initiatives intended to enhance appropriability of research benefits by
investing firms in areas of new technological opportunity, identification of the former
effects from single country analyses will remain difficult. Further utilization of
international panel data seems a promising avenue for further work in this as in other
connections.
Research using use quasi-experimental (propensity score or sample selection
corrections) to comparing “treated” firms and “controls” offers another line of future
                                                                                                                               
significant deviation from the theoretical expectation, and, in addition it is in the direction opposite that
which superficial examination of the table might suggest.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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advance, especially if it could be coupled with the design of actual policy experiments.
31
This suggests the concluding thought that really important gains in the informational
basis for economic policy in this area are only likely to come as a by-product of coupling
better policy design with the application of the sophisticated econometric techniques that
have now become available.
                                               
31 See Klette, Moen, and Griliches (this volume) for further discussion of this point.David, Hall, and Toole September 1999
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(Public R&D) Controls Method
"Net" Findings 
(elasticity)
Scott (1984) 1974 LB cross-section 3338 Log (private R&D) Log (Gov. R&D)






Leyden at al. (1989) 1987 Lab. cross-section 120 $ Private Lab budget $ Gov R&D Funding to Lab




Leyden and Link (1991) 1987 Lab. cross-section 137 $ Private Lab budget $ Gov R&D and Equipment
R/S, lab K-sharing, 
D(chem/bio), D(basic R) 3SLS
complementarity 
(.336)






$ Gov R&D subsidy
Log (Gov R&D)
sales, sales sq., cash flow, 
time dummes FE OLS
neither (1 for 1)
complemntarity (0.06)
See text for details.
OLS = Ordinary least squares; 3SLS = three stage least squares; FE = Fixed effects
Where the regression is in levels, the elasticity is derived using the mean levels of R&D spending for the sample.
Table 1 






(Public R&D) Controls Method
"Net" Findings 
(elasticity)
Hamberg (1966) 1960 Firm CS within ind. 8*(~20) Private R&D E / Total E $ Gov contracts/Assets
size, deprec., invest., 
lag R&D E Wtd OLS
mixed/
 complementarity
Shrieves (1978) 1965 Firm CS across ind. 411 log (private R&D E) % Gov. Financed R&D
size, prod mkt, tech 
oppty, C4 OLS substitutability
Carmichael (1981) 1976-77
Firm CS within ind.
(transportation) 46*2 $ Private R&D Expenditure $ Gov R&D contracts size   pooled OLS substitutability





Link (1982) 1977 Firm CS across ind. 275 Private R&D/Sales Gov financed R&D/sales
profit/S, divers., C4, 
D(governance) OLS complementarity
Lichtenberg (1984) 1967, 72, 77 Firm CS across ind. 991 Change in priv. R&D/sales Change in Gov R&D/sales size, ??? Fixed Effects substitutability
Lichtenberg (1987) 1979-84 Panel across ind. 187*6 $ Private R&D Expenditure $ Gov-financed R&D
Year dummies, size, 
sales to Gov. pooled OLS Insignificant
Lichtenberg (1988) 1979-84 Panel across ind. 167*6 $ Private R&D Expenditure $ Gov-financed R&D
Year dummies, size, 
sales to Gov. FE OLS, IV
substitutability (IV)
 complementarity (FE)
Wallsten (1999) 1990-92 Firm CS across ind. 81 $ Private R&D Exp. in 1992
Number of SBIR awards, 
Total value of SBIR awards
age, size, patents, R&D 
exp. (1990), D(never 
apply), Ind. and 
geography dummies OLS, 3SLS substitutability
Definitions: E=employment.  CS=Cross section.  FE=Fixed effect (within or firm dummies)
             FD=First differences IV=instrumental variables
Table 2a













 (Canada) 1967-71 Firm panel within ind. 6*44 $ Private R&D Expenditure  $ Gov R&D grants
size (poly.), profit, 




Firm CS across and 
within ind. 5*(~47) log (private R&D) log (Gov R&D grants)
size, divers., HHI, 




 (Italy) 1983 Firm CS within ind. 86
Private R&D (MM lire),  
   log (private R&D)
% Gov. Financed R&D,     
log (gov R&D/total R&D)
size, profit, D(div), 





 (Spain) 1988 Firm CS across ind. 147
Private R&D Expenditure,
R&D per employee
D(participation in subsdy 
loan program)













1993 Panel  across ind. 133*3 $ Private R&D Expenditure
$ Gov-financed R&D (loans 
and subsidies)
Investment, cash flow, 
interest rate, current 
and one lag of all 
variables FD IV
subsitutability-subsidies
 to large firms (-.10) 
 loans and small firms
 insignificant
Definitions: E=employment.  CS=Cross section.  FE=Fixed effect (within or firm dummies)
             FD=First differences IV=instrumental variables
Table 2b










 (Canada) 1965-69 Cross-section 15 R&D E/Total E Gov R&D/sales
D(tech oppty), % Foreign, ind. 
conc., sales growth  OLS complementarity
Buxton (1975)
 (United Kingdom) 1965 Cross-section 11 Private R&D/Gross output Gov R&D/Gross output C4, Divers., entry barriers?,  OLS complementarity
Goldberg (1979) 1958-75 Panel 18*14 Log (private R&D/output)
Gov R&D/sales           
(sum of lag 0&1)
Ind. Dummies, price of R, lag 
priv. R/output FE OLS complementarity
Lichtenberg (1984) 1963-79 Panel 12*17 Change in private R&D Change in Gov R&D Year dummies, Ind. Dummies,  FE OLS insignificant
Levin and Reiss (1984) 1963, 67, 72 Panel 20*3 Private R&D/prod. costs Gov R&D/shipments
Tech dummies, Basic R 
share, Ind. Age, HHI 2SLS complementarity
All studies use U.S. data unless otherwise noted.
See Table 2 for definitions.
Table 3






(Public R&D) Controls Method
"Net" Findings 
(elasticity)
Levy and Terleckyj (1983) 1949-81 Time-series 33 $ Private R&D Stock
$Gov contracts to industry 
(stock)
lag output, lag taxes, unemp., 
age R&D stock, $ Gov R&D, 
$ reimb. GLS complementarity
Terleckyj (1985) 1964-84 Time-series 21
$ Private R&D 
Expenditure $Gov contracts to industry
output, gov. durables, lag 
R&D in Europe/japan GLS complementarity
Lichtenberg (1987) 1956-83 Time-series 28
$ Private R&D 




 (cross-country) 1963-84 Panel 9*21
$ Private R&D 
Expenditure $Gov contracts to industry
GDP, country dummies, 
pred. Europe & Japan priv. 
R&D pooled GLS complementarity
Robson (1993) 1955-88 Time-series 33
Change in private basic 
research
Change in federal basic 
research
Level & chg priv. appl. R, 
Gov. appl. R, Gov. 
purchases, chg in non-gov 
goods&serv. OLS - 1st-diff complementarity
Diamond (1998) 1953-93 Time-series 41 $ Private basic research $ Federal basic research GDP, time trend




von Tunzelmann and 
Martin (1988)
 (cross-country) 1969-95 Panel 22*27 Change in private R&D Change in public R&D
Levels of private and public-
funded R&D, country 
dummies Fixed Effects complementarity
All studies use U.S. data unless otherwise noted.
See Table 2 for definitions.
Table 4
Aggregate Studies